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The social context can have a large impact on economic decisions. The theoret-
ical challenge is to formulate a model that encompasses both social and economic
decisions in a meaningful manner. We discuss the incorporation of social context
into neoclassical economic models using social institutions. We also discuss the
relationship between social institutions, social capital, and the social value of as-
sets (introduced by Mailath and Postlewaite (2002)). Keywords: Social Capital,
Social Assets, Social Institutions. JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: Z13
1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that the social context within which economic decisions are made
can have a large impact on those decisions. Social context matters for several reasons:
ﬁrst, individuals may care about some social characteristics, such as status, honor, or
popularity; second, preferences may be inﬂuenced by the environment; ﬁnally, even if
individuals have exogenous preferences only over “economic” variables, the nature of
interactions that facilitate economic activity can themselves be at least partially social
in nature.
The social context must be taken into account when studying many applied economic
problems. If status, honor or popularity are important to an individual, predictions
about labor market response to taxes or bonuses that ignore these considerations will
be less accurate than predictions that consider these factors. Any serious investigation
into the aﬀect that the social context has on economic decisions requires a theory as to
the nature of the interaction between the two.
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Understanding and modelling the social context of economic decisions is a distinct
enterprise from the economic analysis of social decisions (such as the economics of crime
and marriage). While the latter work demonstrates the value of expanding the scope of
traditional economic analysis, it does not directly provide insight into modelling social
context. The economic analysis of social decisions succeeds by studying social phe-
nomena (those once thought beyond the scope of traditional economics) using models
satisfying neoclassical assumptions. In contrast, modelling the social context may re-
quire nonstandard preferences or endogenous preferences.1 Models that deviate from
the neoclassical paradigm certainly provide insights into particular problems. We will
show that, as in the economic analysis of social decisions, it is also possible to provide
insights into some problems centrally involving a social context without deviating from
the neoclassical paradigm with respect to preferences. The challenge is to formulate a
model that encompasses social and economic decisions in a sensible manner, and at the
same time allows for a distinction.
This challenge is a diﬃcult one. When is a decision economic rather than social?
While many anonymous interactions in a competitive market are clearly economic, other
decisions that seem economic have social elements. For example, the long run relation-
ship between an upstream and a downstream ﬁrm with moral hazard aspects is clearly
economic. On the other hand, we could interpret this as a long-run “trust” or “favor”
relationship. Are the Maghribi traders studied by Greif (1993) involved in an economic
or a social interaction? While we cannot as yet provide a formal distinction between
economic and social decisions, we describe here examples in which the distinction is
clear.
Groups in a society often have shared values, shared notions of acceptable behavior,
and mechanisms to encourage or impose standards of acceptable behavior. A group’s
shared values, acceptable behaviors, and enforcement mechanisms constitute the social
institutions for the group. We formalize this idea as: if all (or most) individuals of
a group behave in accordance with the same principle, then that group has a social
institution governed by that principle. Moreover, if that behavior is an equilibrium,
then the social institution governed by that principle is an equilibrium phenomenon.
This notion captures property rights regimes, formal and informal legal structures, as
well as class structures.
This framework underlies Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) (hereafter CMP1)
and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1998) (hereafter CMP2), which analyze a dynastic
growth model with men and women who match and have children. After matching, they
1An example of the former is Becker (1991), who examines how the utility that individuals get from
a restaurant meal may be aﬀected by the number of other diners. Two examples of the latter are Bisin
and Verdier (2000), who study a model in which individiduals take into account the aﬀect of their
choices on their children’s preferences about religion, and Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2002), who
argue that a woman’s education and labor choices aﬀect her son’s preferences over women.September 20, 2002 3
allocate their endowment between their own consumption and a bequest to their male
oﬀspring, whose consumption enters parents’ utility function. Diﬀerences in the ways
that men and women (optimally) match can be viewed as diﬀerent social institutions.2
The primary aim of CMP1 is to illustrate how, within a given economic environment,
diﬀerences in social institutions are associated with distinct savings and investment
patterns. It is assumed in that paper that consumption of matched couples is joint,
hence men and women both prefer wealthier mates to less wealthy mates, ceteris paribus.
In one type of matching, wealthier men match with wealthier women. When wealthier
men match with wealthier women, there is an incentive for parents to leave larger
bequests. Larger bequests make their male oﬀspring more desirable, and hence able
to attract a wealthier mate; since consumption is joint, this increases the son’s utility.
This generates a competition among dynasties that leads to larger bequests than in the
case of a dynastic growth model without the matching component.
In addition to this equilibrium, CMP1 discusses a second social institution consistent
with optimizing agents, which they termed “aristocratic” matching. Here, there is an
exogenous “social ranking” of dynasties, and sons inherit the rank of their father. It
is proposed that the wealthiest women match with the men who rank highest in the
social ordering, even if these men are not the wealthiest men. There is a question about
the incentive compatibility of such a proposed matching: Why would a wealthy woman
match with a less wealthy man than she could attract simply because of an artiﬁcial
social rank? The answer is that such a proposed matching rule might be incentive
compatible: a woman who matches with a higher ranking man knows that the son
of a high ranking man will inherit the rank, and will attract a wealthy mate in such a
ranking. Women who put positive weight on the welfare of their oﬀspring will sometimes
ﬁnd the bargain attractive. This second matching arrangement is interesting because it
eliminates the tournament-like competition among dynasties; when the men who match
with the wealthiest women are those born of high rank, the bequest a couple leaves
to their son will no longer aﬀect his match. The decreased incentive for a matched
couple to bequeath wealth to their sons leads to a lower growth rate in societies that
are governed by this aristocratic matching system than in societies governed by the
“wealth-is-rank” matching system.
However, the incentive compatibility of such a social institution is fragile. Incentive
compatibility of the social institution of aristocratic matching requires that even for very
low ranked agents, the possibility of one’s descendants losing rank suﬃces to prevent
opportunistic behavior (in particular, oversaving in an attempt to improve a match).
In general, one would not expect this to hold (see Landsburg (1995) and Cole, Mailath,
and Postlewaite (1995)). Indeed, this is an important insight from that work. In
CMP2, other social institutions are studied that address the fragility of the aristocratic
2In other work, we have used the term “social arrangements” to describe these diﬀerences.September 20, 2002 4
matching. In particular, it is in general true that the social institution where high
ranked agents match according to the aristocratic matching, while low ranked follow the
“wealth-is-status” matching (with an appropriate mixing for middle ranked) is incentive
compatible.
In our view, social capital is created by society’s social institutions. In the examples
above, there may be two distinct social institutions that can govern the matching within
a society, and agents’ behavior diﬀers markedly depending on what social institution
is in place. When the social institution governing matching is wealth-is-rank, parents
consume less and bequeath more than when the social institution governing matching
is aristocratic.
When there is a range of possible social institutions, assets no longer have a value
that is necessarily independent of the governing institution. Since diﬀerent social insti-
tutions can create diﬀerent incentives for a variety of economically relevant behaviors
and decisions, assets that have little (or no) value under some social institutions may
have positive value under others. Mailath and Postlewaite (2002) (hereafter MP) illus-
trates this point. MP analyze a model in which individuals with identical costs make
human capital investments that depend on the social institutions governing matching.
MP introduce the notion of the “social value” of an asset. An agent may have a number
of assets, the possession of which lead to higher utility than would be possible without
them. Examples include both alienable assets that can be transferred to other people
such as machines or money, and inalienable assets that cannot be transferred - human
capital. For a ﬁxed set of preferences and technology, an asset may or may not have pro-
ductive value. A machine that can produce radios and a bel canto (“beautiful singing”)
voice both have productive value. Other assets may not have direct productive value,
yet the possession of them may lead to higher utility. For example, it may be that in
a particular society agents with lighter skin or a particular accent enjoy higher con-
sumption than those with darker skin or a less desirable accent, even if those attributes
have no productive value per se.T h esocial value of an asset is that part of an asset’s
value that stems from the social institutions, that is, the part of the value beyond what
is attributable to the asset’s productive value. We next describe how the model with
social assets.
2. Social Value of Assets
Consider a generational model in which men and women match and have children.
Men and women jointly consume their endowments. People get utility from their own
consumption and their descendants’ consumption. Individuals’ sole decision is whom
to match with, and since consumption is joint, people prefer wealthier partners. There
will trivially be an equilibrium in which each person’s wealth determines completely his
or her match.September 20, 2002 5
MP show that in addition to equilibria of this kind, there may be additional equi-
libria in which nonproductive attributes aﬀect matching. In particular, in equilibrium,
attributes that have no fundamental value can have instrumental value. Individuals
care about their children’s consumption, which depends on the children’s’ (random) in-
come. It is assumed that it is impossible to insure against this risk; this missing market
allows the possibility that social arrangements may arise that ameliorate the resulting
ineﬃciency.
Suppose that there is a heritable attribute that is independent of income, height for
example, and suppose further that the attribute does not enter people’s utility functions.
Suppose that, nevertheless, in this society tall people are considered desirable mates,
that is, that people are willing to match with a tall person with slightly less income
than a short person. In such a society, people will naturally prefer their children to
be tall since, all else equal, they consume more. But if they prefer tall children, and
height is a heritable attribute, they will naturally prefer tall mates. In other words, a
preference for tall mates may be self-fulﬁlling. Notice that this has nothing to do with
any intrinsic desirability for tall people; within this same society it could equally well
have been that shortness was a desirable attribute. Any heritable attribute might serve
as a social asset in this way.
If the social arrangements make height a desirable attribute, we see that the degree
of assortativeness of matching on wealth is decreased relative to the case that matching
is on wealth alone. When there is no such desirable attribute, wealthy men match
only with wealthy women and vice versa. When the social arrangements value an
attribute such as height, some wealthy short people match with tall less wealthy people.
The consequence of social arrangements that value such assets is that the variance of
consumption in society is lower. When people are risk averse, the social arrangements
that value attributes that are fundamentally extraneous can be welfare superior to
arrangements that ignore such extraneous attributes.
2.1. Formal Model
There is an inﬁnite sequence of two-period lived agents, each of which consists of a
continuum of men and women. There is a single non-storable consumption good. In
e a c hp e r i o d ,o l dm e na n dw o m e nm a t c ha n dc o n s u m et h e i rc o m b i n e dw e a l t h( s ot h a tt h e
good is a public good within couples). In addition, each couple has two oﬀspring. The
common consumption utility function for old agents is concave and denoted U : < → <.
Individuals care about their descendants’ welfare: the utility to any matched couple
is their utility from consumption plus the discounted average utility of their children,
with common discount rate β. This means, of course, that their utility depends on the
consumption of all future generations.
While agents neither take actions nor receive utility in their ﬁrst period of life,September 20, 2002 6
they may acquire an attribute. We assume that agents can only acquire this attribute
through their parents: both oﬀspring will have the attribute for sure if both parents
possess the attribute, they will surely not have it if neither have it, and they will have it
with probability 1/2 if one parent had the attribute. For simplicity, it is assumed that
either both oﬀspring have the attribute, or neither does. Individuals with the attribute
are y agents, while those without the attribute are n agents. This attribute does not
enter into agents’ utility functions. The transmission of the attribute may be thought
of as genetic and the attribute a characteristic like height, or as an attribute that is
culturally transmitted, such as an accent.
Each agent receives an endowment of the consumption good (income) at the be-
ginning of their second period of life. This income is either high (H)o rl o w( L). MP
assume an agent’s income is independent of the parents’ incomes. Possible consumption
levels for matched pairs are 2H, 2L and H + L. Agents are equally likely to have high
or low income. The utility function is normalized so that U(2L)=0a n dU(2H)=1 ,
and the third possible consumption level, H + L, is denoted by u; u ∈ [1/2,1) since U
is concave.
The only decision an agent makes in this economy concerns matching. A matching
is stable if no unmatched pair of agents can increase each of their utilities by matching,
taking into account the consequences for their descendants.3 Am a t c h i n gi sstrictly stable
if any unmatched pair of agent characteristics would strictly decrease their utilities by
matching (taking into account the consequences for their descendants).
In each period half the men and half the women have the attribute, independent of
the matching. As a consequence, the distribution over characteristics is independent of
the matching. In this case, in order to analyze equilibrium it is enough to describe the
stable matchings.
2.2. Matching
Since the attribute is unproductive, and the distribution over oﬀspring characteristics is
independent of parents’ characteristics, any matching positively assortative on income
will clearly be stable. The assortative matching has high income men match with high






3S i n c et h e r ea r en os i d ep a y m e n t s ,am a t c h i n gw i l lo n l yb ed e s t a b i l i z e di fboth agents in an unmatched
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This matching is referred to as the mixed matching. As in the assortative matching,
Hy’s match with Hy’s and Ln’s match with Ln’s, but unlike that matching, Hn’s match
with Ly’s. The question of stability of this mixed matching immediately arises when the
attribute is unproductive. Why would an Hn give up current consumption by matching
with an Ly, who contributes less to current consumption than an Hn?C l e a r l y ,i ft h e
discount factor β is 0, that is, if parents care only about their personal consumption,
mixed matching is not stable: an Hn man and an Hn woman would have higher utility
by matching together than they would have if they followed the prescribed matching,
whether or not other agents follow the mixed matching prescriptions.
However, if parents care about their children, there is a beneﬁtt oa nHn who
matches with an Ly when all other agents are following the prescribed mixed matching.
An Hn’s oﬀspring will have the attribute with probability 1/2 when matched with an
Ly, but with probability 0 if he or she matches with another Hn. While the possession
of this attribute doesn’t aﬀect the child’s income, it does aﬀect who they will match
with. An Ly child will match with a high income agent (Hn), while an Ln child
matches with an Ln. Consequently, if other agents are following the prescriptions of
mixed matching, the attribute has value in aﬀecting oﬀsprings’ matching prospects
(and, a fortiori, consumption prospects) even when the attribute is nonproductive. The
fact that the attribute has value because of its aﬀect on matching doesn’t ensure that
the mixed matching is stable of course. Stability will be determined by the trade-oﬀ
that an Hn faces between the lower current consumption that matching with an Ly
entails and the expected beneﬁti tw i l lc o n f e ro nh i so rh e ro ﬀspring. The more concave
agents’ utility function (that is, the greater the parameter u is), the less is the loss in
current consumption when an Hn agent matches with an Ly, compared with the utility
that would result from matching with another Hn.In addition, the more weight parents
put on their children’s welfare (that is, the greater is β), the greater is the beneﬁtt oa n
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2.3. Productive Attributes
T h ed i s c u s s i o na b o v ea b o u tt h em o d e li nM Pi l l u s t r a t e sh o wd i ﬀerent social arrange-
ments (diﬀerent matching patterns) are associated with diﬀerent economic consequences:
the variance of consumption is lower under mixed matching than under assortative
matching. That discussion focussed on the case in which the attribute is nonproduc-
tive, that is, the attribute is completely independent of anything that enters directly
into peoples’ utility function. The focus on nonproductive asset case makes particu-
larly clear how social arrangements can aﬀe c tt h ev a l u eo fa na s s e t .I fa na t t r i b u t ei s
productive (that is, it aﬀects the probability that an individual will have high income),
the attribute will naturally be valued. MP show that even in the case that an asset
has direct value because it is productive, there may be additional value to the asset
stemming from the social arrangements. Suppose, for example, that the attribute in
question is height. It may be that height has a productive component; for example, a
tall person may be able to reach the top shelves in a storage closet without getting a
ladder, thereby being able to do some tasks more quickly than a shorter person. In such
a scenario, the attribute may lead to a higher probability of high income than would be
the case in the absence of the attribute. All people would naturally prefer taller partners
in such a world, even if height did not enter directly into utility functions, since people
would realize that the children they have with tall partners are more likely to have high
income than the children they have with short partners.
That the attribute may have additional social value can be seen as follow. Since the
attribute is productive, people will prefer partners with the attribute to those without,
all other things being equal. But if the productive advantage is small, there may be two
stable matchings corresponding to those described above for the unproductive attribute
case. One will have high income people without the attribute matching with like part-
ners, and a second will have high income people without the attribute matching with
low income people with the attribute. The situation is as before: it may be that the
social arrangements in the society are such that if others in society value the attribute
above and beyond its productive value, then it is rational of each individual to do so as
well.
MP provide suﬃcient conditions under which both assortative matching and mixed
matching are stable. The attribute will have greater value in the mixed matching case
than in the assortative matching case; the increased value under mixed matching should
be thought of as the social value of the asset, since it stems from the social arrangements
that operate in that case.September 20, 2002 9
2.4. Endogenous Attribute Choice
We have seen above how the social arrangements in a society can aﬀect individuals eco-
nomic welfare. Agents in the model as described make no economic decisions; their only
choice was whom to match with. MP extend the basic model to incorporate an economic
decision and show that the economic decisions depend on the social arrangements in a
society. We brieﬂy describe that extension.
The model with productive assets is extended to allow parents to spend money to
provide children who do not inherit the attribute some probability of acquiring the
attribute. The last section described how the value of an exogenously allocated produc-
tive asset diﬀered depending on the operative social arrangements. Social arrangements
that lead to higher attribute value will then provide parents with a greater incentive to
invest in the attribute for those children who have not inherited the attribute. Parents’
response is then to invest more, leading to a higher proportion of people who have the
attribute, and consequently, higher average income.
Another way of describing this last result is to say that a productive attribute such
as education can have diﬀerent returns in a society depending on the social arrange-
ments within that society. There will be a direct economic return from investment in
education that does not depend on social arrangements, but in addition there will be a
social return investment in education that can depend on the social arrangements. If
a large society is composed of several subsocieties, and each individual in a subsociety
always matches with someone in the same subsociety, it may be possible for the subso-
cieties to be governed by diﬀerent social arrangements. One may be governed by the
social arrangement in which education is valued solely for its productive value, while
a second may be governed by a social arrangement that has a social value in addition
to the direct productive value. Even if the individuals in the two subsocieties face the
same labor market, individuals in the second subsociety will, on average, acquire more
education because of the social value. The possible diﬀerence in returns to investment in
education that individuals face because of diﬀerences in social arrangements illustrates
the usefulness of models that focus on multiple equilibria as the way in which the social
environment aﬀects economic decisions.
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